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For several years now, well before the Reagan administration came to 
power, American nuclear strategy and arms control policy has confused three 
possible uses of nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons have been viewed (1) as 
instruments to deter an attack by threatening an adversary with 
unacceptable punishment, (2) as warfighting capabilities keyed to winning 
or prevailing in an armed conflict with another nation, even one possessing 
nuclear weapons, or (3) as a vehicle to neutralize an adversary's threat to 
use them for purposes of diplomatic coercion or blackmail or, as 
opportunities might arise, to employ them as bargaining levers Confusion 
of these possible uses of nuclear weapons has introduced, wittingly or not, 
potentially dangerous instabilities in the nuclear balance between the 
United States and the Soviet Union
The first part of this paper focuses on some of the principal features 
of recent American nuclear strategic and arms control policy to highlight 
the current confusion about the threat, use, and control of nuclear 
weapons The second part suggests some of the dangerous and disconcerting 
actual and potential consequences of this confusion and what might be done 
about reducing the dissonance occasioned by competing objectives and about 
reinforcing the stability of the United States-Soviet stalemate for the 
benefit of both countries
2I Expanding the Nuclear Repertoire 
Carter Administration and PD-59
As early as the Kennedy administration, American planners have 
seriously considered adopting a counterforce strategy aimed primarily, if 
deterrence should breakdown, at destroying the Soviet Union's nuclear 
forces and at bringing a nuclear war to a swift conclusion on terms 
favorable to the West  ^ Emphasis was placed on damage limitation through 
the destruction of the adversary's nuclear strike forces Priority 
targeting of the adversary's military capabilities, especially his nuclear 
forces, allegedly maximized incentives to spare American cities and 
maintained nuclear exchanges under tight, centralized political authority 
and control
Consistent with this warfighting mentality, the Kennedy administration 
embarked on a major expansion of American nuclear forces The Minuteman 
program was assigned a high priority, command and control systems were 
upgraded and expanded, and tactical nuclear weapons were deployed m  Europe 
and Asia, and proposals to increase expenditures for conventional weapons 
were adopted as part of administration's flexible response strategy The 
West would control all rungs of the escalatory ladder NATO allies were 
discouraged from building national nuclear forces whose independent use 
during a crisis might undermine the controlled conduct of a nuclear 
exchange British access to American nuclear and submarine technology was 
granted on the expectation that London would earmark its nuclear forces to 
NATO and would join in constructing a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force
3(MLF) Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara directly attacked De Gaulle's 
France for refusing to join the MLF and for having decided to construct a 
force de frappe outside the NATO framework and beyond allied power to 
influence or control McNamara characterized the French force as
dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility as 
oa deterrent
This first major attempt to develop a truly counterforce strategy and 
posture collapsed almost as soon as it had been mounted However many 
strategic nuclear forces the United States may have been able to deploy, 
they could not prevent, according to Pentagon estimates, a devastating 
Soviet nuclear attack on the United States As this harsh truth set in, 
emphasis shifted gradually in declaratory statements from a counterforce to 
a countervalue strategy Official policy embraced the notion of Mutual 
Assured Destruction (MAD) It would be enough to deter the Soviet Union 
from attacking the United States or its allies, if sufficient American 
nuclear forces could survive a Soviet first strike and still visit ^
unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union This level of damage was defined 
as two-thirds of the economic base and 25-30 percent of the Soviet 
population
If American nuclear planners were prepared to accept assured 
destruction as official doctrine, they were unwilling to accept minimum 
levels of nuclear capabilities to meet a MAD test While American official 
pronouncements stressed MAD, American nuclear strike capabilities grew in 
number and destructive power during the 1960s to well above the levels 
needed to meet MAD standards Targeting plans centered first on military
installations in case of a nuclear war Attacks on Soviet cities were to
4be spared as long as possible According to one published report, only 
seven percent of the destructive nuclear capability of the United States 
was aimed directly at cities  ^ The targeting plan for the Soviet Union —  
the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) —  was keyed more to a 
counterforce than to a countervalue posture MAD was preferred as a 
declaratory policy, partly to quiet critics fearful that the U S might 
launch a first strike and partly to dampen the enthusiasm of armed force 
advocates, particularly in the Air Force, who had seized on counterforce as 
a club to beat the administration into accepting even higher nuclear 
requirements than those already underwriting MAD American operational 
nuclear capabilities were too large for MAD yet too small for a genuine 
counterforce or warfighting posture It was MAD-plus
As Soviet nuclear capabilities reached parity with those of the United 
States, pressures began to mount for a re-examination of American nuclear 
might and its relation to the SIOP In ratifying SALT I, the Senate 
accepted the qualifying amendment of Senator Henry Jackson that henceforth 
the president and his negotiators not limit the U S  to levels of 
intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the 
Soviet Union  ^ For Jackson, parity included not only launchers, but throw 
weight where the Soviet Union held almost a two and a half to one advantage 
over the United States (approximately 5 million kilograms for the Soviet 
Union to 2 million kilograms for the United States) The issues at stake 
were not only those of military security but also national status, 
prestige, and bargaining leverage m  reaching arms accords with the Soviet 
Union and m  defining the detente process
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger reportedly pressed the
5throw-weight issue within the Nixon administration Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger was less sensitive to these military concerns than to the 
difficulties of reaching a political accord with the Soviet Union in a 
nuclear domain that had been implicitly conceded to the Soviet Union 
Technological limitations and traditional interest in rocket and artillery 
forces had led Soviet strategists to concentrate Russia's strategic nuclear 
power in heavy missiles By the middle 1970s approximately 70-75 percent 
of its warheads were positioned on ground-launched ICBMs Soviet 
negotiators also claimed that Russian heavy missiles were compensation for 
the U S lead in submarine and submarine-launch technology, long-range 
bombers, and MIRVing as well as NATO forward based systems and British and 
French nuclear forces  ^ Secretary of State Henry Kissinger rested his case 
for arms control on the notion of offsetting asymmetries Both sides could 
have different but no less lethal assured destructive capabilities 
Schlesinger's concerns were at once narrower and broader than 
Kissinger's narrower because they necessarily focused on the issue of 
using nuclear weapons if deterrence broke down, broader, because nuclear 
weapons were viewed as an arm of diplomacy and as a critical determinant of 
perceived bargaining power or leverage at the disposal of the two 
superpowers Schlesinger, like Jackson and others, was bothered by the 
ostensibly meager and unpalatable menu of options offered by MAD In the 
wake of a Soviet attack or in the midst of a major crisis, like the Cuban 
missile controversy, the President was faced with the stark choice of 
initiating a nuclear war or capitulation if his bluff were called The 
Defense Secretary was arguing for a greater selection of options, 
incorporating the possibility of destroying hard and soft military targets
6or economic production centers, while initially exempting Soviet cities 
from almost certain destruction
Soviet expansion of its nuclear forces, consistent with the letter but 
not spirit of SALT I and the era of detente, reinforced Schlesinger’s sense 
of urgency By the middle 1970s the Soviet Union had dulled some of the 
edge of the American technological progress in MIRVed launchers, warhead 
yield, and accuracy With the development of the SS-18 and SS-19, Moscow 
also threatened to widen the already yawning gap in throw weight between 
the superpowers The Soviet Union appeared heading toward a counter force 
capability, especially threatening to American land-based systems Soviet 
insistance on nuclear warfighting capabilities as a standard feature of 
Soviet doctrine provided no comfort for American planners  ^ SALT I and the 
interim accords on offensive systems, including the 1974 Vladivostok 
agreement, seemingly afforded no effective brake on accelerating Soviet 
nuclear power
Soviet nuclear forces not only limited further the options available 
to a president but also threatened to destroy key parts of the U S triad 
The choice facing the United States seemed clear, either it had to convince 
the Soviet Union to arrest its modernization program and dismantle its 
heavy missiles or it had to match this effort to regain what was perceived 
as lost parity at a critical rung of the escalatory ladder The MX was 
designated as the American champion to counter the Soviet challenge or to 
become a bargaining counter in arms control negotiations with the Soviets 
At this juncture in the U S -Soviet competition the MX assumed, in official 
circles, more the role of providing a return to essential equivalence than 
of furnishing the United States with winning warfighting capabilities that
7would ensure escalation dominance and, if deterrence should fail, a 
favorable nuclear exchange for the west  ^ Whereas Kissinger trusted in 
MAD-plus, defined by the offsetting asymmetries characterizing the 
superpower nuclear arsenals, to preserve a stable deterrent and to nurture 
the prospects of a fragile detente, Schlesinger insisted on a more rigorous 
standard for deterrence, including selective nuclear options other than 
cities
Going further, Schlesinger contended that anything less than an 
expansion of American strategic arms or a contraction of Soviet heavy 
weight missiles exposed the United States and its allies to political 
blackmail For Kissinger, American nuclear policy and arms control served 
detente, for Schlesinger it was the other way around
The issues of the debate were blurred somewhat because the SIOP was 
never simply MAD, with no options available to a President beyond mutual 
annihilation, nor did its designers ever claim that its implementation 
would win a nuclear war Until the 1970s the SIOP quietly served MAD —  
and then some —  furnishing a wider spectrum of choices than Schlesinger 
was willing to concede The SIOP itself, however, could obviously not 
substitute for a new missile system like the MX to offset Soviet nuclear 
advances As the relationship between targeting options and nuclear 
capabilities sharpened in public and bureaucratic debates, it was 
inevitable that the SIOP would be increasingly viewed as a mechanism that 
had to be fine-tuned to respond to new possibilities of limited nuclear 
war, to guide efforts to close perceived Soviet superiority in selected, 
but critical, rungs of the escalatory ladder, to preclude political 
blackmail, and to induce the Soviet Union, as in Cuba, to do American
II
8bidding
The Carter administration's management of nuclear strategic and arms 
control policy deepened the confusion surrounding the appropriate uses of 
nuclear weapons as a deterrent, as warfighting, or as compellence The 
mission of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Moscow in March 1977, shortly 
after President Carter's inauguration, failed to achieve a quick 
breakthrough in SALT negotiations The President's Comprehensive Proposal 
envisioned deep cuts in Soviet SS-18 capabilities in exchange for a 
commitment to drop the MX program The proposal was poorly conceived and 
hastily drafted However well intentioned, it rested on a flawed 
conception of what could be reasonably expected from negotiations with 
Moscow over nuclear weapons in areas where the Soviet Union enjoyed an 
advantage and where any diminution of its lead through arms control 
agreements essentially required the Soviets to trade strength for 
weakness
The Carter plan also reflected a surface grasp of the deep 
cross-currents within the American security and arms control community
f
running counter to the President's desire for genuine, if ill-considered, 
arms control and arms reductions The President was caught between two 
unmovable objects On the one hand, there was an intransigent Soviet 
leadership, confused and perplexed by the sudden shift in American 
negotiating stance but no less adamant about conceding any of its hard-won 
advantages under SALT I On the other, the President confronted his 
erstwhile supporters, like Senator Jackson, who demanded deep cuts in 
Russian heavy missiles to remedy the perceived concessions granted under 
SALT I These were perceived to have permitted a Soviet breakout whereby
9Moscow could increase its throw-weight and warhead capabilities without 
technically violating the accord For those pressing for concessions, the 
Vance mission was a dual test of wills both the Soviet leadership and the 
President were being challenged It was no longer a question of preserving 
MAD or even MAD-plus It was one of regaining lost strategic ground and of 
bolstering the perception of a renewed American strength and the need for 
ascendancy as a precondition for bargaining with the Soviet Union on SALT 
issues and on the entire range of differences separating the two countries 
President Carter only dimly understood his adversaries at home and abroad 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk has been widely quoted as saying that during 
the Cuban missile crisis, we were eyeball-to-eyeball, and the other guy
Qblinked President Carter blinked twice when the Vance mission was 
unceremoniously dispatched home from Moscow and when the President turned 
toward a compromise solution for SALT and appeared to domestic opponents as
ohaving capitulated to Soviet demands 7
After so inauspicious a start, it was difficult to focus 
administration attention on maintaining superpower strategic stability —  
not warfighting or diplomatic coercion —  as the principal object of arms 
control talks The administration revealed a crippling and confused 
attitude about what is wanted and how it proposed to convince the Russians 
to accept arms cuts and to rally domestic support behind SALT II It added 
to its perception of weakness and vacillation m  successive decisions 
affecting American strategic and theatre nuclear forces The President's 
cancellation of deployment of the enhanced radiation weapon or neutron 
bomb provoked a serious crisis in confidence between Bonn and 
Washington ^  The willingness of the Carter administration seemingly to
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insulate the European theatre from strategic arms talks deepened German and 
European fears that, in light of growing U S -Soviet parity, Washington was 
unravelling its commitments to the defense of Europe and reducing its 
support of vital European security interests Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s 
address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies m  London in 
the fall of 1977 signalled a concern that the American nuclear deterrent 
might be de-coupled from Europe Bonn expressed reservations about the 
limits m  SALT II on cruise missile deployments m  Europe, its silence on 
the SS-20 threat, and its convenient adoption of a range-rule for the 
Backfire bomber that classified it as a non-strategic bomber and, hence, 
outside the purvue of the superpower talks The cancellation of the B-l 
bomber, however justified, projected the image of an administration bent on 
reaching an arms control accord with the Soviet Union without having 
bargained for something m  return The successive shocks of the Iranian 
crisis, administration temporizings over reports of an enhanced Russian 
military contingent in Cuba, and the Soviet invasion of Afganistan sealed 
the fate of SALT II, compelling President Carter to withdraw the treaty 
from the Senate
Even if these unfortunate events had not occurred, the SALT II treaty 
had been seriously eroded as an arms control device SALT was hostage to 
the strategic nuclear modernization program proposed by the armed forces, 
including the MX, Trident, the Stealth bomber (with C-4 and D-5 warheads), 
cruise missiles, and to some extent for intermediate-range nuclear missiles 
in Europe The MX was the critical link between an arms accord and a SI0P 
capable of launching, if need be, a disarming or, at least, damaging 
limiting attack against Soviet long-range missiles At the close of the
11
Carter years, it had assumed an elaborate form involving 200 long-range 
missiles which were to be secretly transported around race-tracks 
comprising 4600 possible points from which a missile could be fired The 
MX passed from the tenuous status of a bargaining chip, first proposed by 
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, to that of a key part of the American 
strategic triad The MX possessed characteristics which suited it for 
limited nuclear war It was time-urgent, fast-firing, accurate, 
penetrable, survivable, quickly reprogrammable, and responsive to command 
and control JCS support for SALT hinged on the MX It supposedly 
resolved the contradictions between the SI0P, based on MAD-plus and now 
necessarily extended to cover expanding Soviet nuclear power,^ and 
expectations raised by proponents of arms control and arms reductions The 
Carter MX would have added 200 MX launchers and 2000 warheads to the 
American arsenal Since the Carter race-track scheme did not solve the 
problem of vulnerability, opponents had reason to charge that the MX was 
designed as a first-strike weapon Alternatively, if it were to be only 
used as a deterrent, it was potentially dangerous, for it was more a traget 
than a deterrent and would have to be used early— and very likely 
precipitately— to preclude its destruction
The strategic debate and consensus in the United States tilted several 
more degrees toward warfighting and coercive diplomacy with the announced
signing but not publication of Presidential Directive 59 PD-59 signalled
12a change m  the American targeting plan Although signed by the 
President on July 25, 1980, in the midst of the presidential election 
campaign, an intensive review of the American nuclear employment policy had 
begun at least two years earlier PD-59 built on Secretary of Defense
12
James Schlesinger's announced doctrine of limited nuclear options which was 
crystallized in 1974 in National Security Decision Memorandum 242 PD-59,
however, departed in two significant ways from previous thinking First, 
the President authorized American strategic nuclear forces to give greater 
priority to Soviet ICBM and military and political leadership sites, 
including relocation centers Second, the military was directed to develop 
a capability to fight an extended nuclear war which might last several 
months rather than a few hours or days Nuclear forces were to endure a 
Soviet first-strike and repeated nuclear salvos and to be sufficiently 
flexible to respond selectively at the behest of responsible military and 
political officials to the exigences of the nuclear conflict As nuclear
O
forces were modernized, new and more powerful C l  systems, capable of 
surviving repeated nuclear attacks, were also to be installed to ensure a 
controlled nuclear exchange
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown accented the deterrent thrust of 
PD-59's significant shift in targeting priorities and in force 
requirements This is not a first strike strategy, Brown affirmed In 
addressing the contingency of a breakdown in deterrence, necessitating the 
use of nuclear war to stop an aggression, PD-59 was supposed to make 
nuclear less likely because the Soviet leadership [could] have no 
illusions about what such a war would mean for Soviet state power and for 
Soviet society ^  Brown's countervailing strategy was designed to
blunt any Soviet incentive to use nuclear weapons or to threaten them for 
political g a m  We cannot afford the risk that the Soviet leadership 
might entertain the illusion that nuclear war could be an option— or threat 
a means of coercion— for them ^  Brown and his supporters emphasized the
13
paternity of PD-59 tracing back its evolutionary origins, as Brown 
remarked, to Secretaries McNamara and Schlesinger, to name only two of my 
predecessors who have been most identified with development of our nuclear 
doctrine ^
Explanations and amplifications of the meaning of PD-59 reinforced, 
rather than quieted, concerns about its first-strike and warfighting 
orientation As long as PD-59’s MAD roots were exposed and as long as it 
was linked to arms control proposals that appeared to temper, if not tame, 
the first-strike characteristics of the MX system, there was a thin thread 
of plausibility to the Carter administrations's defense of PD-59 as an 
enhancement of deterrence understood as a reinforcement of MAD-plus The 
case weakened when the MX was placed within the context of the Carter 
administration's nuclear modernization program, including the Trident 
submarine (armed with increasingly accurate C-4 and eventually silo-busting 
D-5 missiles), the Stealth bomber, and strengthened CJI systems Together 
these forces, when deployed, constituted an attack force potentially 
capable of launching a disarming first-strike
Soviet strategists, not surprisingly, viewed PD-59 simply as a device 
to upset superpower parity, to abandon MAD in favor of warfighting, and to 
use nuclear weapons for political blackmail General Mikhail Milshtein 
summarized the Soviet case against PD-59
Some people in the United States began to hope that by 
improving the accuracy of its strategic systems and building 
new missiles like the MX and Tndent-2, the United States 
could somehow upset the present balance of forces in its 
favor, breaking the existing parity with the Soviet Union and 
finally achieving real superiority in strategic offensive 
forces
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Of course, this is an illusion the Soviet Union will 
never permit parity to be upset But nevertheless this 
encouraged thoughts that the new Minuteman warheads, the 
Trident submarine system, the projected MX missiles, and so 
on, could be used as instruments of threat short of mutual 
assured destruction, for foreign policy ends
What is new now, it seems to me, is that the possibility of 
waging nuclear war has been accepted on the very highest 
levels of the American government The acceptability of 
nuclear war (sic ) And the possibility of victory in such a
war 17
18Milshstein’s criticisms were echoed by domestic critics Once SALT
II had become a dead issue, defending a countervailing strategy as a
deterrent posture aimed solely at preventing the Soviet Union from winning
a nuclear war or using nuclear weapons as bargaining levers lost some of
its force Proponents increasingly stressed the Soviet threat, the need
for escalation dominance in case of hostilities, (not just equivalence or
19parity), and selective nuclear targeting Like capitalists in the 
Marxist-Leninist scheme who prepare the way for Socialism, so Carter 
advocates of countervailing strategy prepared the ground for the Reagan 
administration's expansion of American strategic capabilities and, 
paradoxically, an arms control position, reminiscent of the Carter 
administration's failed March 1977 demarche, that insisted on unprecedented 
cuts m  Soviet nuclear forces What new nuclear weapons might not 
achieve— nuclear superiority and maximal political and psychic 
leverage— then arms control negotiations were expected to compensate for 
real or perceived weaknesses and disparities in the American posture The 
adversary would either face certain defeat in a confrontation with the 
United States or he would have to capitulate in an arms accord or be spent
into submission
15
The Reagan Nuclear Regime
This review of the post-SALT period stresses the continuity of 
evolving American strategic doctrine, nuclear capabilities, and arms 
control policy rather than the differences and the departures The trend 
has been toward assigning more and more complex roles to nuclear weapons 
For purposes of this argument it is not necessary to show that the Reagan 
administration has fully and unequivocally adopted a warfighting and 
coercive diplomatic stance Even if it would have wished to fully abandon 
MAD and SALT, it is hindered by technological and strategic realities and 
by an intransigent Congress which has placed sharp limits on MX development 
and insisted on progress m  START All that need be demonstrated is to 
show that the Reagan administration has reinforced and even accelerated the 
trend toward accepting nuclear weapons as warfighting and coercive 
instruments In harmony with this view, it can also be shown that the 
Reagan administration has attempted to set arms control negotiation targets 
which would enhance the quest for superiority either through Soviet 
acceptance of the American nuclear modernization program or a substantial, 
if not total, dismantling of some of the Soviet Union’s most modern nuclear 
systems
In announcing his five-point, $222 billion proposal for strategic 
modernization, President Reagan spoke of a window of vulnerability that 
had to be closed 20 In March 1982 and again a year later, the President
pointed out that on balance the Soviet Union does have a definite margin
21of superiority His advisors pointed to the superiority of Soviet
throw-weight, destructive megatonnage, and MIRVed heavy missiles as well as
16
a dominant, European theater advantage with the deployment of the Backfire
bomber and, more significantly, of SS-20 missiles armed with three nuclear
22warheads ACDA Head Eugene Rostow publicly identified the principal 
sources of administration concern In general terms, the most threatening 
features of this [Soviet] buildup have been the massive increase m  
hard-target-kill-capable intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM reentry 
vehicles, the growth m  the destructive potential of Soviet strategic 
forces as a whole, the deployment of mobile, highly-accurate, and MIRVed 
long-range theater nuclear forces, and the continued development of
their already extensive strategic air defenses As a result, two legs
2 ^of our strategic triad are now threatened
Before negotiations about arms control could be undertaken, a 
broad-based modernization program had first to be set in motion to 
re-establish what was perceived as American inferiority and to re-assert 
American nuclear ascendancy Otherwise, as Rostow and others suggested, 
such a situation [inferiority] is a recipe for nuclear blackmail ^  The 
Soviet lead was supposed to be translatable into coercive power through 
perceptions of U S weakness J  Secretary Alexander Haig went further and 
linked the growth of Soviet military power to Moscow’s interventionism 
abroad and its promotion of violent change around the globe ^  The 
Secretary of State called for approval of the MX The question is not 
whether we want to build a system with the unique capabilities embodied in 
the MX, but whether we can maintain an adequate deterrent without it ^  
Deterrence required the MX's fast-reaction, hard-kill features An 
increase in American strategic power was needed to blunt the exploitation 
by the Soviet Union of its military power We have learned, said the
17
Secretary of State, "that Soviet-Amencan agreements, even in strategic 
arms control, will not survive Soviet threats to the overall military 
balance or Soviet encroachment upon our strategic interests in critical 
regions of the world Linkage is not a theory, it is a fact of life that 
we overlook at our peril
The Reagan proposals of October 1981 featured a five-point plan for 
strategic modernization (1) upgrading and expansion of C^I systems, (2) a 
bomber program comprised of 100 B-l aircraft, increased R and D for 
Stealth, B-2 modification to carry cruise missiles, and production of over 
3,000 cruise missiles to be deployed on B-52 Gs, (3) a sea-based program 
comprising construction of the seven Trident submarines to be built at an 
annual rate of one each year between 1981-1987, development of the more 
accurate D-5 or Trident II missile (scheduled for entry into service by 
1989), and deployment of several hundred nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise 
missiles, (4) development and deployment of at least 100 MX, each armed 
with 10 warheads, and (5) the modernization of North American air defenses 
and R and D for ASAT systems ^9
The accent on accurate, time-urgent nuclear striking power belied the 
Administration's interest in deterring the Soviet Union by putting "at risk 
those things —  including their military capabilities —  which they value 
most "30 The Secretary of Defense presented a comprehensive rationale for 
this first installment on the administration's strategic modernization 
program
Should deterrence fail and strategic nuclear war with the USSR 
occur, the United States must prevail and be able to force the 
Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on 
terms favorable to the United States
18
The United States must have plans that assure US strategic 
nuclear forces can render ineffective the total Soviet 
military and political power structure and forces that
will maintain, throughout a protracted conflict period and 
afterward, the capability to inflict very high levels of 
damage against the industrial/economic base of the Soviet 
Union so that they have a strong incentive to seek
conflict termination short of an all-out attack on our cities 
and economic assets
US strategic nuclear forces and their command and 
communication links should be capable of supporting controlled 
nuclear counter-attacks over a protracted period while 
maintaining a reserve of nuclear forces sufficient for trans- 
and post-attack protection and coercion ^
This sketch of the employment plan for nuclear weapons re—affirms 
PD-59's primary focus on Soviet military and power structure and, 
secondly, on the Soviet Union's industrial and economic base The high 
priority given to CJI systems is consistent with this scenario of a 
protracted nuclear exchange requiring survival command and control links to 
dispatch residual nuclear forces to remaining Soviet targets, as commanders 
presumably work their way down the SIOP hit list according to prescribed 
procedures
Where the extra funds for C3I are to be spent is also of interest 
There are six key links m  the strategic C^I system These include (1) 
sensing devices to detect and assess attacks, (2) command centers to 
evaluate sensor data, (3) political authorities responsible for authorizing 
appropriate responses, (4) command posts where deliberations and decisions 
are taken, (5) a communication network which connects the preceding four 
components, and (6) intelligence facilities to make damage assessments and 
to identify remaining targets to be destroyed
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Priority has been assigned to the sensor and to the military command 
structure components of the C3I system Warning satellites and 
ground-based radars designed to improve Soviet missile attack estimates 
will be deployed along with mobile processing centers and additional PAVE 
PAWS surveillance radars to improve coverage of Soviet submarine activity 
to the southeast and southwest of the United States While funds are 
earmarked for the deployment of E-48 airborne command posts to serve 
political leaders within the National Command Authority, the bulk of the 
funding for the command component of the C3I system will be devoted to 
strengthening military operations, as Secretary Weinberger suggested, in 
the trans- and post- attack protection and coercion phases 33 EC-135
airborne command posts serving military commanders will be hardened against 
nuclear effects and equipped with improved low frequency communications, 
linked to upgraded satellites, capable of reaching the Trident and Poseidon 
nuclear fleet Inter-communications among the attack elements of the 
nuclear triad will also be strengthened This enlarged, hardened, 
reliable, and efficient network is intended, within a decade, to service an 
enhanced nuclear war capability initiated under the Carter administration 
and accelerated and expanded under the Reagan regime
Viewed against this decade-long modernization process, fueled and 
motored by notions of warfighting and coercive diplomacy under the guise of 
enhanced deterrence, it is not surprising that at some point attention 
would be given to the strategic defense component of American nuclear 
forces —  the ABM treaty and powerful opposition groups within the United 
States to such a re-evaluation to the contrary notwithstanding President 
Reagan's October 1981 strategic modernization proposals, including funds
20
for air defenses and ASAT system, foreshadowed the President's March 23, 
1983 announcement of a $26 billion Strategic Defense Initiative SDI 
follows quite logically from the President's earlier modernization 
proposals and is consistent with what has unfolded in evolving American 
strategic thinking since the Schlesinger doctrine was first made public a 
decade before The layered-defense outlined in Congressional testimony 
envisions a program to develop new surveillance, target acquisitions and 
tracking components, directed and kinetic energy weapons, and battle 
management and support systems for a multi-tiered ABM system It would be 
designed to detect and kill missiles and warheads through the boost, 
post-boost, mid-course, or terminal phases of flight Both long-range and 
shorter-range defense systems would be developed to protect against 
submarine and air-launched missiles aimed at the United States and its 
allies ^
SDI was presented as a two-edge word one dull and blunted, the other 
sharp and cutting I clearly recognize that defensive systems have 
limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities, observed President 
Reagan If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering 
an aggressive policy, and no one wants that The blunt edge of the sword 
was cast in different rhetorical terms, the SDI was portrayed as a 
challenge to the American scientific community to turn their great talents 
now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of 
rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete 35 Which side of 
the sword will be used— to blunt an arms race or to start a new phase of 
the current offensive arms competition— remains to be seen The Soviet 
reaction was swift and not unexpected General Secretary Yuri Andropov saw
21
only the sharp and, m  his words, seamy side of the initiative
In fact the strategic defensive forces of the United 
States will continue to be developed and upgraded at full 
tilt and along quite a definite line at that, namely that 
of acquiring a first nuclear strike capability Under 
these conditions the intentions to secure itself the 
possibility of destroying with the help of the ABM 
defenses the corresponding strategic systems of the other 
side is a bid to disarm the Soviet Union ^6
Until the forced compromises with Congress on the MX and arms control 
in 1983 and 1984,37 the Reagan administration's approach to START and INF 
arms control negotiations has been essential as one with its determination 
to enhance American offensive strike forces m  Europe and in the strategic 
reserve as well as the nation's nuclear defensive posture Both would be 
achieved either through unilateral development and deployment of these 
systems or through tough bargaining and concessions reached by using these 
systems as bargaining levers Rejecting the nuclear freeze proposal, the 
President posed a rhetorical question to underscore his opposition to a 
freeze Why should the Soviets negotiate if they've already achieved a
freeze m  a position of advantage to them7 38 Arms control could follow 
only after the strategic balance had been rectified to favor American 
security interests Secretary of State Alexander Haig set out the 
principle that arms control efforts will be instruments of, not a 
replacement for, a coherent national and allied security policy 39 ACDA 
Directer Eugene Rostow downgraded the importance of necessarily reading 
arms control agreements with the Soviet Union Arms control
agreements are by no means 'the political centerpiece or the crucial
barometer' of Soviet-American relations ^  Indeed, according to Rostow,
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reflecting a view shared by President Reagan's principal arms control 
advisors, the SALT period permitted a Soviet breakout Not only did we 
accept greater threats to our forces, but we agreed to ceilings and 
definitions that would permit the Soviets greater capabilities against us 
than now exist We settled for superficial limitations while the threat 
grew by leaps and bounds ^
In the negotiations over intermediary nuclear forces (INF), the Reagan 
administration adopted a purist zero-zero negotiating stance The 
proposed emplacement of 572 Pershing II (108) and Tomahawk cruise (464) 
missiles would be deployed unless the Soviet Union dismantled its SS-20 
missiles This unbending posture was retained throughout the bargaining 
process In his March 23 address President Reagan justified the American 
position, characterizing the unrelenting Soviet modernization as a bid for 
superiority The Soviets are still adding an average of three new 
warheads a week and now have 1300 We still have none So far, it
seems that the Soviet definitions of parity is a box score of 1,300 to 
nothing in their favor ^
Based on published reports, the Reagan administration has been 
unwilling to settle for anything less than no loaf rather than a half in 
pursuing its zero-zero proposal-1 No less fixedly, the Soviet Union was 
determined to keep all of its SS-20s The compromise attempted by Paul 
Nitze, the American negotiator and his Soviet counterpart, Yuli Kvitzinsky, 
was rejected by both governments ^  The bases for the American rejection 
are of interest The Nitze accord was faulted for equating American cruise 
missiles (75 to be retained with 300 warheads) with Soviet SS-20s (75 to be 
left in Europe with 225 warheads, equal roughly to targets presented by
»
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NATO's principal military command and operational installations)
President Reagan had repeatedly underlined his preference for fast flyers 
(Pershing Ils) over slow flyers (cruise missiles) Other officials 
alternatively objected that the ceilings abandoned America's Asian and NATO 
allies, specifically West Germany, or released the Europeans from their 
obligations to accept deployment, including the Pershing Ils Japan and 
China were cited to have a legitimate commplaint that the Nitze-Kvitsinsky 
understanding shifted the Soviet European threat to Asia m  its failure to 
set global ceilings The American negotiating position, no less than the 
tough stance assumed by Moscow, appeared aimed more at European opinion and 
governmental resolve than at the military threat posed by each side's 
actual or anticipated intermediary nuclear forces However genuine or 
feigned Soviet concerns about the Pershing II may have been, the larger 
stake for political leaders on both sides was the minds, hearts, and will 
of the West Europeans Neither superpower blinkedduring the talks, nor 
were the President and his principal advisors— Nitze excepted— willing to 
acknowledge the winks signalled by the Europeans, especially those 
emancipating from a vacillating Bonn, to reach a compromise with Moscow 
Coercive diplomacy had become multilateralized aimed at adversaries and 
allies alike
The Reagan administrations's START proposal paralleled its INF 
position ^  Deep cuts in missiles launchers (850 ICBMs and SLBMs), throw 
weight limits approximating American levels, and a ceiling on warheads of 
5000, with a sub-ceiling of 2500 for ground-launched missiles, was finally 
adopted Limits were also to be set for bombers, including the Soviet 
Backfire These Phase I objectives were to be achieved before Phase II
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would turn to cruise missile limitations Not surprisingly, the Soviet 
Union was expected to concede its advantage in heavy missiles or face 
continued expansion and modernization of American strategic forces In 
principle, there was nothing particularly unique about such a balanced 
bargaining posture Since U S -Soviet arms control talks began in the late 
1960s, American negotiators had insisted on bargaining chips like the ABM 
to induce Soviet concessions What was different was the discermbly more 
focused and unwavering determination of the Reagan administration to 
achieve a real as well as a perceived position of superiority at levels of 
nuclear preparedness and bargaining leverage in its confrontation with 
Soviet leaders The drive toward superiority had the psychic, if doubtful 
political, advantage of being pursued, as one commentator has suggested, 
independent of the will and desire of the Soviet Union 45 Two, not one, 
arms control games were being played Toward allied and American public 
opinion, the announced game was zero-zero in INF and START Toward the 
Soviet Union the real game was zero-sum
II Limiting the Role of Nuclear Weapons
What not to do in modernizing nuclear forces and in arms talks is 
easier to identify than what might be done to free the superpowers from the 
arms race in which both are pitted at present Both make too much of 
nuclear weapons Promoting them for larger roles m  the superpower 
struggle for which they are ill-cast —  warfighting and coercion —  
reveals a flawed understanding of the critical yet necessarily 
circumscribed, part that they can play in stabilizing the superpower 
stalemate while allowing the actors to play for time to improve relations
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Creating more scenarios for them than they are able to stage successfully 
pressses them into service beyond their measure It risks deluding the 
protagonists into believing that they are adapted to their needs when their 
untoward and thoughtless use may well run at cross purposes to the aims of 
each antagonist
Nor is it reasonable to advertize nuclear weapons for warfighting and 
for coercion as enhancements of deterrence Pursuing a warfighting 
strategy is, as sketched below, potentially self-defeating If deterrence 
is renamed warfighting, the adversaries risk consigning themselves to 
Clausewitz' classical case of pure war m  which each opponent seeks to 
dominate completely the will of the other, undiluted by any other 
consideration The resulting downward spiral of armed or threatened 
hostilities, unchecked by political purpose, uninformed by moral design, 
and driven by unbridled fervor, is fundamentally unstable and winds its way 
inevitably to a fatal clash Deterrence viewed as a bargaining club, 
always at the ready to defend ever widening national and allied political 
and security interests debases its value while enlarging the opportunities 
for an unwanted nuclear clash as both superpowers mistake their deadly 
quarrel as a search for honor in a straw
No one knows whether a nuclear war between essentialy two equally 
matched superpowers can be kept limited but the prospects of maintaining 
control do not appear bright Civilian and military targets are not easily 
distinguished despite the greater accuracy and calibrated striking power of 
today's missiles and warheads Many of the missile fields and military 
bases of both superpower adversaries are located near major population 
centers What blast and thermal damage fail to destroy will be soon
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lethally exposed to deadly radioactive clouds Once the conflict has 
begun, it stretches the imagination to believe that a natural resting 
point, within Schelling’s meaning of the term, can be found to stop the 
exchanges between two committed opponents possessed of thousands of nuclear 
warheads —  and still counting —  which have been long dedicated to destroy 
the adversary’s principal targets of military and civilian opportunity 
Once the initial nuclear exchanges have been made, neither adversary has 
much incentive to trust the other to stop firing To arrest the 
conflagration, the cooperation of each adversary is required, yet the 
devastation created by the war will have eroded the basis for mutual trust 
on which a termination of hostilities is predicated With command and 
control facilities destroyed or inoperative, there is the likelihood that 
the adversaries will lose control over their own nuclear forces One 
Trident submarine is scheduled to house up to 192 warheads capable of 
single-handedly delivering more firepower than very likely all of the 
munitions used since World War II Given equally determined, implacable, 
and resourceful opponents, equipped to destroy each other several times 
over, the conclusion is hard to resist that both sides will remain in the 
foreseeable future at a MAD-plus stand-off
Preparations for warfighting are costly and risky, and they threaten 
to provoke the very conflict each superpower seeks to avoid Destabilizing 
arms races are stimulated —  like the one in which the peoples of both 
countries are currently engaged In an atmosphere of crisis, opportunities 
for accidental, inadvertent, and unintended warfare are multiplied The 
superpowers, having progressively lost control over their competition, are 
correspondingly more susceptible to be catalyzed or catapulted into
r
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conflict by third parties The line betweeen nuclear and conventional 
warfare begins to blur as both are treated as extensions of the other 
False confidence is raised that a limited nuclear war is tolerable and 
possibly winnable Smaller hostilities, especially those involving 
commitments that have been identified with the deterrence posture of one or 
the other or both of the superpowers, assume high stakes and risk 
escalation beyond the merit of the interests at issue Incentives for 
pre-emptive and preventive warfare incease, in such an emotional and 
stress setting, the superpowers, led by fallible humans relying on 
error-prone systems, may well be overtaken by a pre-venge psychosis bent 
on seeking revenge for a stike yet to be launched but imminently expected 
The case against deterrence posing as warfighting can be set against 
the claims of partisans who repair to nuclear weapons to gain a superior 
bargaining position over an opponent Armed nuclear adversaries nullify 
each other's efforts to score an advantage at the negotiating table The 
INF talks turned as much on a struggle of will between Washington and 
Moscow to impose preferred solutions on each other and on the West European 
states as it did on the military issues raised by the SS-20s and the 
planned deployment of NATO missiles The negotiating struggle became 
de-coupled psychologically from the dispute over weapons The Pershing II 
and cruise missiles covered targets already included in the SIOP No 
matter, either, that American troops and their dependents, not to mention 
thousands of other Americans m  Western Europe, were hostages to American
intent to defend Europe
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Seeking Uncommon Sense
A logical starting point from where to return to the now old but tried 
notion of deterrence as unacceptable punishment of an aggressor who might 
attack American vital interests is to recognize the obvious The robust 
nuclear destructive capacity of both superpowers MAD-plus mutually 
prevails and shows no signs of dissipating even though both powers might 
seek an unattainable position of superiority The second point, the 
inverse of the first, is that arms control negotiations cannot be expected 
to secure a superiority already precluded on military and technological 
grounds If one examines the common features of arms accords between the 
superpowers, one sees that they largely served the very limited, but highly 
useful, role as a legitimating mechanism through which each opponent 
accepted, implicitly if reluctantly, the nuclear levels and modernization 
plans covered by the agreements of his counterpart These accords 
succeeded when the superpowers pursued the goals of balance and equivalence 
while apprised of the maddening but inevitable asymmetries of the 
inventories possessed by each side The SALT I and II treaties were 
cooperative efforts to define rules for modernization, R and D, and 
verification procedures Since either side can destroy the other, each has 
earned in a perverse sense what the French would term a droit de regard to 
pass and approve on the kill potential of the other That droit de regard 
can be assumed unilaterally with all the attendant uncertainties that are 
prompted by a strategy bent on imposing one adversary’s will on the other 
whether he cooperates or not in his submission Or, that right can be
exercised mutually and cooperatively by the contestants while their earnest
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struggle continues
It is also clear, given a history of real or imagined grievances 
between the superpowers and the sure and unsettling march of scientific 
discovery and technological advances, that the arms control process —  if 
not arms control accords —  is forever While each accord must be taken as 
a serious exchange of confidences and good will, it would be wrong to 
believe that any one accord by itself can be a reliable reed to lean upon 
in developing a workable security system There is a continuing need for 
superpower negotiations over the rules of their competition and for a 
periodic codification, streamlining, and revision of them Such a 
conception of the arms control process is admittedly modest when compared
to the claims implicitly made by what Leon Wieselter calls the war and 
46peace parties
Buying time through negotiations is also related to buying time in a 
crisis by designing and deploying weapons which are not prone to time 
urgent use Land-based missiles should be replaced The MX and Pershing 
II are lightening rods for enemy missiles So also are the Soviet Union's 
heavy missile systems Commanders and policy makers should not be placed 
in a situation requiring a quick and potentially precipitate decision to 
use or lose their weapons
The ratio of launchers to warheads, and not the reverse, should be 
stressed in START negotiations The build down concept should not be 
pushed to such a logical absurdity that arms points are narrowed while 
warheads are proportionately increased Such postures invite disarming 
attacks In any event, only invulnerable or hard-to-track and attack 
systems, like the proposed, Midgetman missile, should be comtemplated
\
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Priority targeting of the SIOP should be seriously reviewed If 
deterrence fails, it makes no sense to destroy, as the prime target, the 
Soviet political leadership How can a war be terminated if one has no one 
with whom to negotiate7 If invulnerable systems can be deployed, nuclear 
targeting might well begin with soft military targets and, at first, be 
confined to demonstrations after the fashion of across the bow proposals 
that have been previously advanced It also does not stretch the 
imagination too far, if both sides have comfortable margins of invulnerable 
nuclear striking power, to exchange information about the primary targets 
that might initially be hit to build confidence that if the nuclear 
threshold is crossed, perhaps unwittingly, then the negotiated standard 
operating procedure for the SIOP on each side might well be to destroy a 
pre-designated target or set of targets to assert the will and 
determination of the aggreived party to carry the struggle up the 
escalatory ladder This proposal is no more implausible and potentially 
far less destructive than the scenario proposed by Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger, quoted earlier, which envisions repeated nuclear exchanges over 
a protracted period in which nuclear weapons are treated as bargaining 
counters
Finally, wherever possible, missions earmarked for nuclear weapons 
should be re-assigned to conventional weapons Ironically, the major 
portion of the Reagan administrations spending on defense has been for 
conventional forces ^  The administrations ambitious nuclear arms program 
has obscured the progress made in modernizing conventional forces It has 
the worst of two worlds it draws fire from the Soviet Union and domestic 
critics worried about the first-strike and warfighting proclivities of the
31
Reagan program while the President receives little or no notice for the 
contribution he has made to stability by giving high priority to 
conventional forces Only 15 percent of the defense budget is earmarked 
for strategic nuclear forces, an appreciably lower figure than, for 
example, France American nuclear capabilities are bigger than life while 
conventional forces are smaller and weaker than they deserve in the image 
that they project
Conclusion
There is little point and potentially much mischief m  confusing the 
roles that nuclear weapons can and cannot play As a punishment for 
aggression they have served well, if uncomfortably, as instruments of 
national and allied security They have undoubtedly discouraged the Soviet 
Union from contemplating an attack on the United States or its allies To 
enlist deterrence in a quest for superiority undermines the useful service 
that it has performed since World War II and has the potentially pernicious 
effect of de-stabilizing the hard-won stability that has been achieved
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for strategic nuclear forces, an appreciably lower figure than, for 
example, France American nuclear capabilities are bigger than life while 
conventional forces are smaller and weaker than they deserve in the image 
that they project
Conclusion
There is little point and potentially much mischief in confusing the 
roles that nuclear weapons can and cannot play As a punishment for 
aggression they have served well, if uncomfortably, as instruments of 
national and allied security They have undoubtedly discouraged the Soviet 
Union from contemplating an attack on the United States or its allies To 
enlist deterrence in a quest for superiority undermines the useful service 
that it has performed since World War II and has the potentially pernicious 
effect of de-stabilizing the hard-won stability that has been achieved
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